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ABSTRACT 
Benjamin M. Lawsky and the New York State Department of 
Financial Services upended the regulatory dynamics of the 
international banking world in August of 2012 when the New York 
agency reached a staggering settlement with Standard Chartered 
Bank.  The Department of Financial Services accused the bank, 
which is headquartered in London, but maintains a profitable branch 
in New York, of violating laws related to United States sanctions 
imposed upon certain financial transactions with Iran. Although 
allegations of this sort are not unprecedented, Lawsky’s actions and 
the $340 million settlement were alarming because, in this case, the 
state regulator acted without any involvement from federal 
regulators, who were “on the verge of concluding” that the majority 
of Standard Chartered’s transactions with Iran were legal. 
The settlement illustrates the tension between state and federal 
regulators when confronted with alleged violations of law committed 
by a foreign bank.  Specifically, the settlement raises the question of 
whether a state regulator should be involved in the regulation of a 
foreign bank operating in the United States, particularly when the 
bank is primarily violating federal laws that implicate issues of 
foreign policy.  This Comment examines these issues, starting with 
an introduction of the statutory framework regarding the regulation 
of foreign banks, followed by a discussion of the various reactions to 
the Standard Chartered settlement, both positive and negative.  This 
Comment then provides recommendations for resolving the issues 
raised by the settlement, ultimately concluding that the principle of 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of 
Michigan, 2010.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement 
throughout my entire lifetime.  I would also like to thank my advisor, Professor Sean 
Griffith, for his guidance and recommendations regarding this subject matter.  Finally, I 
would like to thank my father who, although no longer with us, showed me how to be 
strong and courageous in the face of adversity. 
1022 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
comity paves the way for proper coordination and deference to the 
appropriate authority—whether state or federal—in the case of 
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 6, 2012, the New York State Department of Financial 
Services (“DFS”) issued an order pursuant to New York Banking Law 
Section 39, accusing Standard Chartered Bank (“Standard Chartered”) 
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of engaging in illicit dollar-clearing transactions with Iran.1  The order 
directed Standard Chartered, a London-based bank, to appear and 
explain apparent violations of law; demonstrate why Standard 
Chartered’s license to operate in the State of New York should not be 
revoked; demonstrate why Standard Chartered’s United States dollar 
clearing operations should not be suspended pending a formal license 
revocation hearing, and submit to and pay for an independent, on-
premises monitor of the DFS’s choosing to ensure compliance with rules 
governing the international transfer of funds.2  On August 14, 2012, one 
day before Standard Chartered was to appear before the DFS, the parties 
agreed to settle the matters in the DFS order from August 6, 2012.3  The 
settlement required Standard Chartered to pay a civil penalty of $340 
million to the DFS.4  Notably, the order and the ensuing settlement took 
place without any intervention from or coordination with federal 
regulators.5 
While some commentators lauded the DFS and its superintendent 
Benjamin M. Lawsky for their aggressive stance against violations of 
federal and state banking laws, others criticized the settlement as a rogue 
undertaking that failed to allow federal regulators an adequate 
opportunity to intervene in the matter.6  Whether Mr. Lawsky and the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, Standard Chartered Bank, 1 
(NYS Dep’t. of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ 
ea120806.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3. See Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Statement from Benjamin M. Lawsky, 
Superintendent of Financial Services, Regarding Standard Chartered Bank (Aug. 14, 
2012), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1208141.htm. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Laundering Case Settled by Bank for $340 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/08/15/business/standard-chartered-settles-with-new-york-for-340-
million.html?pagewanted=all. 
 6. Compare Jonathan Weil, Standard Chartered Fought the Lawsky and the 
Lawsky Won, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-08-16/standard-chartered-fought-the-lawsky-and-the-lawsky-won.html 
(explaining that the public benefits from having an active, competent, and functional 
state regulator that is willing to seek large penalties from banks), with Peter J. Henning, 
What’s Next in the Standard Chartered Case, DEALBOOK (Aug. 8, 2012, 4:43 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/whats-next-in-the-standard-chartered-case/ 
(discussing the problems that arose due to the lack of coordination between the DFS 
and federal regulators), and Somasekhar Sundaresan, New York State Erodes Rule of 
Law with Standard Chartered Bank, BUSINESS STANDARD (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/new-york-state-erodes-rulelawstandard-
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DFS deserve praise or criticism, the settlement between the DFS and 
Standard Chartered raises some serious regulatory issues regarding the 
extent to which a state regulator should be involved in the regulation of 
a foreign bank operating in the United States, particularly when the bank 
is primarily violating federal laws that implicate issues of foreign 
policy.7 
Part I of this Comment will describe the role of foreign banks in the 
United States banking system and the statutory framework regarding the 
regulation of those banks.  Part II will parse out the issues arising from 
the DFS settlement with Standard Chartered and will discuss the 
positive and negative responses to the settlement.  Finally, Part III of 
this Comment will address the framework required to alleviate the issues 
arising from overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, concluding that the 
basic principle of comity paves the way for proper coordination and 
deference to the appropriate regulatory authority. 
I. FOREIGN BANKS OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Part I of this Comment provides a background of foreign banking 
operations in the United States and the statutory framework regarding 
the regulation of those banks.  Specifically, this Part describes the 
federal regulatory scheme that Congress has implemented through the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (“IBA”) and the Foreign Bank 
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (“FBSEA”).  It then discusses 
the remaining power of state regulators over foreign banks, including an 
explanation of the DFS’s powers, such as the ability to utilize Section 39 
of the New York Banking Law. 
A. RISE IN FOREIGN BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Foreign banks are permitted to operate in the United States through 
various corporate forms.8  The decision regarding how to enter and 
                                                                                                                 
chartered-bank/483734/ (suggesting that it is improper for a state regulator to involve 
itself in issues relating to international relations between the United States and a foreign 
nation). 
 7. See generally Janet Babin, Settlement Spotlights Upstart N.Y. Regulator, NPR 
(Aug. 18, 2012, 2:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/18/159066054/settlement-
shines-light-on-n-y-regulator-agency; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5. 
 8. MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS AND 
AFFILIATES IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (5th ed. 2008). 
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operate in the United States banking market is significant for foreign 
banks because it may result in certain operational and regulatory 
consequences.9  A branch of a foreign bank operating in the United 
States is subject to less regulation than a separately incorporated, 
federally-insured bank subsidiary, which may be why foreign banks 
often choose to set up their United States operations in this manner.10  
Indeed, there were 214 foreign bank branches in the United States as of 
December 31, 2007, accounting for 72.5% of all foreign banking assets 
in the nation.11 
Foreign banks, whether operating through branches or other 
corporate forms, have dramatically increased their presence in the 
United States commercial banking market.12  As a result, foreign banks 
have served to expand credit in the United States, promote financial 
innovation and foreign investment, and enhance the globalization of 
United States banking markets.13  The rise of foreign banking activity in 
the United States, however, prompted Congress to enact a 
comprehensive federal regulatory structure to govern the operations of 
foreign banks.14  Legislation such as the International Banking Act of 
1978 and the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 
marks a notable trend toward more federal oversight of those foreign 
banks operating in the United States.15 
B. INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978 
Concerned that foreign banks operating in the United States were 
not receiving proper supervision from federal regulators, Congress 
enacted the IBA to create a more adequate legal framework for 
regulating such banks.16  Most importantly, the IBA shifted major 
responsibility for the oversight of foreign banks to the federal level.17  
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 37–38. 
 11. Id. at 38. 
 12. Id. at 3. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. Id. at 7.  Congress passed other federal statutes regarding the regulation of 
foreign banking activities in the United States.  However, this Comment will discuss 
only the IBA and the FBSEA, since they are most relevant. 
 16. Id. at 4, 8. 
 17. John P. Segala, A Summary of the International Banking Act of 1978, FRB 
RICHMOND ECON. REV., Jan./Feb. 1979, at 16, 19. 
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Indeed, the IBA was “designed to improve federal control over 
monetary policy” and allow federal regulators to become more involved 
in supervising the activities of foreign banks in the United States.18 
Prior to the IBA, it was most common for state banking regulators, 
rather than federal authorities, to license and supervise foreign banking 
operations in the United States.19  After the IBA was enacted, branches 
and agencies of foreign banks were able to obtain federal licenses from 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), subjecting them 
to primary regulation by the OCC, instead of being limited to state 
licenses and corresponding state regulation.20  In addition, the IBA 
provides supervisory authority to several regulators, including the OCC, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, 
and the states.21  These regulators were able to assert jurisdiction over 
those foreign banks that operated within its territory, enabling the 
regulatory authorities to perform examinations and reviews as 
necessary.22  Accordingly, foreign banks now must contend with 
overlapping layers of federal and state regulatory regimes.23 
C. FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1991 
Congress renewed its attempt in the late 1980s and early 1990s to 
establish a meaningful role for federal authorities in foreign bank 
regulation.24  As a result, Congress passed the FBSEA in 1991, which 
introduced new methods of approval and monitoring of foreign banks 
and created heightened responsibility for the Federal Reserve Board in 
the regulatory process.25  In so doing, the FBSEA substantially increased 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See id. at 20; see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that 
the IBA achieved Congress’ desire to establish a “federal presence” in the regulation 
and supervision of foreign bank activities in the United States). 
 19. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 20. See 12 U.S.C. § 3102 (2006); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 9. 
 21. Segala, supra note 21, at 19. 
 22. Id. 
 23. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 10. 
 24. Id. In particular, the collapse of Bank of Commerce Credit International led 
policymakers to question the effectiveness of United States supervision of foreign 
banking operations. These concerns were amplified after “widespread media accounts 
of unauthorized lending to Iraq by the U.S. operations of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.” 
Id. 
 25. Id. 
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the authority federal regulators have regarding foreign banks operating 
in the United States.26 
Prior to the FBSEA, a foreign bank needed only to obtain the 
approval of the state or federal licensing authority to open a branch in 
the United States.27  Now, section 202 of the FBSEA requires advance 
Federal Reserve approval, as well, for a foreign bank to establish any 
branch in the United States.28  Pursuant to the FBSEA, the Federal 
Reserve may only offer approval if the foreign bank operates its non-
U.S. business is directly within the field of banking, it is adequately 
overseen by the appropriate local authorities in its home country, and it 
provides the Federal Reserve with all materials necessary to conduct a 
proper assessment of the bank’s application.29 
Section 7(e) of the IBA, which was enacted as part of the FBSEA, 
permits the Federal Reserve to close any United States office of a 
foreign bank.30  In addition, the FBSEA authorizes the Board to examine 
any foreign bank office, although it is directed to coordinate its 
examinations with the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), and state banking authorities whenever possible.31  This 
requirement serves to ameliorate the consequences of overlapping 
jurisdiction and encourages a more unified examination process.32 
To coordinate the examination process, the Board has worked with 
several other regulators, including the OCC, the FDIC, the NYSBD, 33 
and state authorities.34  For example, the Federal Reserve Board and the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Stephen J. Field, Scott N. Benedict, & Francoise M. Haan, New Law 
Significantly Increases Regulation of Foreign Banks in U.S., reprinted in FEDERAL 
SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN BANKS IN THE U.S. 40 (George M. Cohen et al. eds., 1992). 
 27. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11.  In practice, most banks obtained only 
the approval of the state licensing authority because relatively few foreign banks chose 
to apply for a federal license directly from the OCC.  See id. 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (2006); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11; Field, 
Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26, at 41. 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e); Field, Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26, at 41. 
 31. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B)(i). See GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 13. 
 32. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 57. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve is not required to rely on examination reports 
prepared by the other supervisory authorities. Field, Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26, 
at 43. 
 33. In 2011, the New York State Banking Department (“NYSBD”) and the New 
York State Insurance Department were merged to create the DFS. See Standard 
Chartered Bank 6 n.8 (NYS Dep’t. of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 34. See GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 57–58. 
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FDIC entered into a national agreement in December of 1998 with state 
banking departments to coordinate state examination activities with 
those of the Board and the FDIC.35  The agreement requires states to 
designate a specific Federal Reserve Bank and FDIC Regional Office to 
be responsible for examination and supervisory obligations.36  Foreign 
banks, therefore, enjoy a single regulatory point of contact for 
scheduling and planning examinations.37  In addition, the State 
Coordination Agreement allows for one state-banking supervisor to 
coordinate the examination and supervision of a foreign bank licensed in 
multiple states.38 
D. STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY AFTER THE IBA AND FBSEA 
While the Federal Reserve gained more regulatory prominence 
under the FBSEA, the licensing authority, whether the OCC or the state, 
is still an important part in supervising the operations of those foreign 
banks within its jurisdiction.39  While the IBA provided foreign banks 
with the option of applying for a federal or state license, most foreign 
banks still choose to obtain a license from the state in which they 
reside.40  This choice reflects a bank’s decision to submit to primary 
regulation by the state rather than federal authorities.41  Accordingly, 
state banking regulators license the most foreign banks and have 
retained a significant amount of power to supervise foreign banks that 
are operating within their jurisdiction.42 
E. NEW YORK BANKING LAW 
New York Banking Law (“N.Y. Banking Law”) requires every 
licensed foreign banking corporation operating in the state to maintain 
appropriate documentation of its in-state transactions and transactions 
involving any other office of the foreign bank that is located outside the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See id. at 58. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 39. 
 40. Id. at 38. 
 41. Id. at 39. 
 42. Id. at 74. 
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state.43  The superintendent of the DFS may examine all of the books, 
records, and accounts of any agency or branch of a foreign bank located 
in New York State.44  The superintendent may also examine any books, 
records, and accounts of other offices of the foreign bank that are 
maintained in New York.45  Because foreign banks have established a 
significant banking presence in New York,46 these powers retained by 
the superintendent are significant.47  In addition, every foreign bank 
licensed in the state must prepare written reports describing its asset, 
liabilities and other pertinent matters as requested by the 
superintendent.48 
Foreign banks seeking to open branches in New York must satisfy 
initial requirements similar to those specified in the FBSEA.49  For 
instance, the superintendent must consider the home country’s 
regulatory regime and the extent of that regime’s jurisdiction over the 
bank and whether the bank will be able to provide enough information 
regarding its operations and activities.50  In fact, New York amended its 
application requirements after passage of the FBSEA to more closely 
parallel those of the Federal Reserve.51  Furthermore, the superintendent 
has the power to issue orders directing foreign banking corporations to 
appear and explain an apparent violation of law, discontinue 
unauthorized unsafe practices, make good an impairment of the required 
capital, make good encroachments on required services, and keep books 
and accounts as prescribed by the superintendent.52  Notably, the statute 
lacks any indication that only violations of state law can produce a 
sanction.53 
                                                                                                                 
 43. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200-c (McKinney 2008); 10 N.Y. JUR. 2D Banks § 585 
(2013). 
 44. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(4); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 85. 
 45. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(4); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 85. 
 46. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 75. 
 47. Cf. Henning, supra note 8 (pointing out that Lawsky, as head of the DFS, has 
unusual powers under the N.Y. Banking Law to affect the operations of a foreign bank). 
 48. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 204. See also 10 N.Y. JUR. 2D Banks § 585. 
 49. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 77. 
 50. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, Supervisory Policy FB § 1.2 (2013); 
GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 77. 
 51. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 78. 
 52. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 39.  This provision supplied the DFS with the statutory 
authority to issue the order on August 6, 2012 to Standard Chartered Bank. 
 53. Henning, supra note 8. 
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II. STANDARD CHARTERED’S SETTLEMENT WITH THE DFS 
Part II of this Comment describes the operations and activities of 
Standard Chartered in the United States.  It also discusses Standard 
Chartered’s settlement with the DFS, identifying the issues at stake and 
introducing the range of responses to the settlement. 
A. ACTIVITIES OF STANDARD CHARTERED IN THE UNITED STATES 
Standard Chartered is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard 
Chartered PLC, a British bank with a strong international presence.54  
Licensed to operate in New York State,55 Standard Chartered PLC offers 
many products and services to its clients, including its dollar clearing 
operations, which add substantially to Standard Chartered PLC’s 
revenue.56  The United States Government, through the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), regulates these dollar clearing 
operations by imposing sanctions against those who attempt to use the 
United States’ financial system in contravention of United States foreign 
policy or present a threat to national security such as Iran, North Korea, 
and the Sudan.57  From 2001 to 2010, Standard Chartered allegedly 
engaged in dollar clearing transactions with Iran called “U-Turns”, 
which were permitted for some time under limited circumstances and 
with close regulatory supervision. 58  In November 2008, however, the 
United States Treasury Department revoked authorization for “U-Turn” 
transactions with Iran due to concerns that Iranian banks were using that 
money to purchase nuclear weapons.59 
In an order issued on August 6, 2012, the DFS accused Standard 
Chartered of designing and implementing an elaborate scheme to clear 
illegal transactions in U.S. dollars with Iran by using its New York 
branch as a front for the prohibited dealings.60  According to the DFS, 
these dealings with Iran threatened peace and stability internationally.61  
Among the violations of law propounded by the DFS were 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 1, 5. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 5, 6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 7–8. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. Id. at 2. 
 61. Id. at 22. 
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“unauthorized transactions” pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 560.516, which was 
promulgated by OFAC and regulates the transfer of funds involving 
Iran.62  According to the DFS, any banking institution that engages in 
“unauthorized transactions” is unsafe and unsound.63 
B. THE SETTLEMENT 
On August 14, 2012, the DFS and Standard Chartered agreed to 
settle.64  Both entities agreed that the transactions were worth at least 
$250 billion.65  The settlement included the following terms: Standard 
Chartered was obligated to pay a civil penalty of $340 million to the 
DFS, install a monitor for two or more years to ensure that appropriate 
money-laundering risk controls and corrective measures are firmly in 
place in the New York branch, and permanently install personnel to 
ensure that the bank’s compliance with due diligence and monitoring 
requirements.66 
Commentators agree that the settlement was a “victory” for 
Benjamin Lawsky and the DFS, which confronted the bank without any 
involvement of federal regulators;67 however, some federal authorities 
were concerned that the deal could compromise their abilities to reach 
settlements with the bank.68  Indeed, the actions also perturbed British 
authorities who felt that Lawsky was spoiling their banks’ reputation.69  
In his defense, Lawsky explained that he was pressured to act in the face 
of Standard Chartered’s continuing breach of compliance measures 
regarding bank secrecy and money-laundering.70 
In any case, the $340 million fine was an enormous sum for a 
single state regulator to reap from a settlement with a foreign bank.71  
Banking industry officials have said that this type of occurrence—a state 
regulator, acting on its own, threatens to take away the state license of a 
global bank and then secures a public settlement of this magnitude—is 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 25. 
 63. Id. at 22. 
 64. Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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unprecedented;72 however, there is a reason why the DFS was able to 
take the lead in the case against a multinational financial institution 
rather than adhering to the ordinary procedure and deferring to federal 
regulators and prosecutors.73  In most cases, a state banking regulator is 
not able to exert much control over foreign banks.74  The dynamics of 
this situation were different, however, because the DFS oversees bank 
operations in New York.75  As New York stands as the American 
financial hub, a foreign bank seeking to do business in the U.S. is 
virtually required to perform its transactions in the state.76  Therefore, 
the DFS had the rare ability to affect the business of a foreign bank with 
only minor operations in the United States.77  Furthermore, because the 
scope of Section 39 of the N.Y. Banking Law is not limited to violations 
of state law, Lawsky possessed the legal authority to accuse Standard 
Chartered of violating federal law prohibiting certain dealings with 
Iran.78 
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE SETTLEMENT 
Lawsky’s claim that Standard Chartered violated state law by 
concealing pertinent information from American investigations enabled 
him to achieve a grand settlement.79  Nonetheless, critics point to two 
major problems with this approach.  First, the Department of Justice was 
in the midst of deciding not to file criminal charges just prior to DFS’s 
actions, after concluding that the Iranian transactions substantially 
complied with federal law.80  And second, DFS failed to include any 
federal regulators in its investigation and subsequent action against the 
bank.81  In fact, the DFS appeared to intentionally keep the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Babin, supra note 7. 
 73. See Henning, supra note 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  Lawsky has been unapologetic in his approach, despite the widespread 
criticism he has faced. Id. 
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authorities in the dark once it commenced its investigation of Standard 
Chartered.82 
There is another significant issue raised by the settlement with the 
DFS.  A New York State banking license is necessary for banks doing 
business with United States currency.83  Trades in United States 
currency must be cleared through the United States, and this effectively 
means that such trades must be processed in New York, because that is 
where the nation’s financial institutions are primarily located and where 
the most important banking transactions typically occur.84  Therefore, it 
is impossible to tell whether Standard Chartered actually settled with the 
DFS on the grounds that it egregiously violated state and federal laws or 
whether the settlement was a result of intense pressure levied by the 
unusually powerful position of a New York State regulator.85  In other 
words, the settlement may have been more a representation of the 
potential costs of a DFS sanction involving the revocation of Standard 
Chartered’s license and not the scope Standard Chartered’s illegal acts.86 
Finally, and more generally, the Standard Chartered settlement 
illustrates the problems associated with the growth in overlapping layers 
of federal and state regulation.87  This expansion has forced banks to 
confront a “prosecutorial maze” when defending against alleged 
violations of banking law.88  In practice, banks operating in the United 
States may be subject to examination by different branches of one 
federal agency as well as other federal and/or state regulators.89  
Moreover, the termination of an investigation by one agency does not 
mean that another will discontinue its own investigation and possible 
enforcement measures.90  While these overlaps could be minimized by 
means of inter-regulatory coordination,91 the Standard Chartered case 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Babin, supra note 7. 
 83. Tim Worstall, Did Standard Chartered Settle With the DFS? Or Were They 
Mugged by It?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2012, 8:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
timworstall/2012/08/15/did-standard-chartered-settle-with-the-dfs-or-were-they-
mugged-by-it/. 
 84. Id. (explaining that a New York State banking license is essential for any bank 
conducting business in U.S. dollars). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The Prosecutorial Maze, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21564563. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
1034 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
illustrates that meaningful communications among agencies are often 
lacking, undermining regulatory efficiency. 
D. POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT 
The DFS settlement with Standard Chartered challenged the 
ordinary regulatory paradigm in which state regulators cower behind the 
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, and the Department of 
Justice,92 but one could argue that what occurred in this case actually 
served to benefit the public.93  The fact that federal regulators were 
compelled to seek larger penalties for their own settlements with 
Standard Chartered can be seen as a positive.94  In fact, having an active, 
competent, functional state regulator can only be beneficial because it 
would force the federal government to better oversee, rather than 
protect, large banks.95 
The settlement also undermined Standard Chartered’s assertion that 
it had conducted only $14 million of illegal transactions with Iran.96  
Although Lawsky estimated the figure at $250 billion, the $340 million 
deal appears to vindicate the DFS’s claims that the illegal transactions 
were worth far more than $14 million.97  In addition, one could argue 
that Lawsky and the DFS had clear jurisdiction over the matter because 
it involved violations of state law.98  If the crux of the allegations were 
that Standard Chartered lied to the DFS about complying with an 
agreement to correct deficiencies in its anti-money-laundering systems 
and that Standard Chartered lied in its books and records about its 
transactions with Iran, then N.Y. Banking Law empowers the DFS to 
bring such an action against a foreign bank.99  Ultimately, one could 
point to the federal government’s lackluster job of overseeing large 
banks and argue that someone needed to step in and be forceful for 
once.100  That someone was Benjamin Lawsky, a former federal 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Weil, supra note 6. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
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prosecutor who was willing to step up and promote justice by penalizing 
those institutions that violated federal and state laws.101 
E. NEGATIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT 
Critics of the DFS settlement with Standard Chartered point out the 
difficulties inherent in a state agency asserting authority over federal 
issues.  Since the DFS is not a federal agency, like the Federal Reserve 
or the Department of Justice, it does not account for the interests of the 
entire nation or the means of interstate trade.102  In addition, the DFS 
interfered in a matter involving United States foreign relations,103 
traditionally reserved for the federal government.104  Therefore, the DFS 
engaged in part in the regulation of banking activity without any specific 
relevance to New York State.105 
Some critics focus on the DFS’s use of coercion to force the 
settlement upon Standard Chartered.  Since Standard Chartered neither 
admitted nor denied fault in its settlement agreements and since 
settlement talks are confidential, whether the bank settled because it 
actually committed the violations or because it merely sought to lessen 
its reputational damage and prolonged press coverage will, in all 
likelihood, never be publicly known.106  The bank faced serious charges 
from a critical regulator and the potential loss of its license to operate in 
New York, which would have devastated its operations and revenue.107  
Therefore, if Standard Chartered agreed to the settlement only because it 
felt that it had no other choice, then the DFS could be seen as extracting 
payments through threats,108 which is an improper government agency 
action.109  Of notable focus is the risk to Standard Chartered’s reputation 
resulting from the DFS’s actions.110  Standard Chartered’s stock price 
dropped 22% after Lawsky announced the accusations on August 6, 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See generally id. 
 102. Sundaresan, supra note 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See An Unsettling Settlement: Standard Chartered Douses Incendiary 
Accusations by Paying a $340M Fine, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21560583. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
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2012.111  Although the settlement allowed the bank’s management to 
avoid censure and continue operating in the United States, Standard 
Chartered’s worldwide reputation has been impaired.112 
The DFS and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo may also be 
perceived as having aggressively pursued the settlement solely to 
enhance their own reputational and financial postures.113  Indeed, 
Governor Cuomo responded to the settlement by praising himself for 
creating the DFS.114  In addition, the settlement money will flow to the 
State of New York, thereby benefitting New Yorkers.115  Another major 
concern involves Lawsky’s decision to move independently of federal 
regulators, effectively shielding the federal government from the DFS 
investigation and subsequent negotiations with Standard Chartered.  
Specifically, the actions by Lawsky and the DFS created a problem for 
the federal government’s own investigations of the bank.116  Because 
Lawsky caught the Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice off 
guard by accusing the bank of misconduct, the federal regulators found 
themselves tasked with determining the course of their investigations far 
sooner than they would have liked.117 
Finally, Lawsky’s “lone ranger” move against Standard Chartered 
has created uncertainty among several global banks.118  The DFS’s 
money laundering allegations have caused global banks to worry that 
their New York operations could make them public targets for 
transactions that federal regulators already decided were legal.119  
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. (“The deal gives the DFS a notable scalp, not to mention a considerable 
financial boost.”). 
 114. Id.; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5 (referring to Governor Cuomo’s 
staunch support for the creation of the DFS as a “modern regulator for today’s financial 
marketplace”). 
 115. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5. 
 116. Henning, supra note 6. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Accusations Facing Bank Cast a Chill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/ 
business/standard-chartered-case-casts-a-chill-over-the-industry.html. 
 119. Id.  In a number of settled money-laundering cases with several European 
banks, such as Lloyds, Barclays, and ING, the Department of Justice and the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office did not object to the “U-Turn” transactions with Iran 
that occurred before the Treasury Department issued its new ruling in November 2008. 
Id. 
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Indeed, federal law enforcement officials have received numerous calls 
from bank executives who were worried that the rules regarding 
Standard Chartered’s disputed financial transactions have suddenly 
changed.120  Therefore, banks may be forced to institute new plans to 
deal with the apparent divergence between state and federal law.121 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUES ARISING FROM 
THE DFS SETTLEMENT 
Part III of this Comment introduces a framework for mitigating the 
overarching problems associated with overlapping regulatory 
jurisdiction among state and federal authorities. As an initial matter, it 
analyzes the consequences of the DFS settlement.  Then, it discusses 
how the principle of comity in the context of vertical federalism should 
serve to alleviate the negative results of overlapping regulatory 
jurisdiction.  In doing so, this Comment argues that state and federal 
regulators should be required to communicate when pursuing potential 
violations, and deference should be granted to either the state or federal 
regulator depending on whether the foreign bank primarily violated state 
or federal law.  This Part further explains that in such a scenario, federal 
regulators should have primary authority to enforce federal law 
violations against foreign banks, and state regulators should be afforded 
primary authority to enforce violations of state law.  As an alternative, 
Part III also proposes amending federal legislation regarding the 
regulation of foreign banks to require greater coordination—in a sense, 
establishing mandatory, rather than voluntary, comity rules—between 
state and federal regulators when responding to violations of law 
committed by a foreign bank. 
A. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR ENFORCE FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST A 
FOREIGN BANK? 
The DFS’s settlement with Standard Chartered raises major 
concerns regarding the extent to which a state regulator should be 
enforcing federal law against a foreign banking corporation.122  The DFS 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (noting the confusion among many bank executives as to whether the 
banking rules have changed). 
 122. See Henning, supra note 6 (noting that the DFS based its case, at least in part, 
on Standard Chartered’s possible violations of federal law regarding the bank’s 
reporting of transactions with Iran); see also Sundaresan, supra note 6 (disparaging the 
1038 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Order dated August 6, 2012 provides numerous references to federal 
issues concerning the United States Government.  For instance, the 
“Preliminary Statement” accuses the bank of engaging in “deceptive and 
fraudulent misconduct” on behalf of Iranian financial institutions “that 
were subject to U.S. economic sanctions.”123  Furthermore, the DFS 
accused Standard Chartered of undertaking a course of conduct that 
included “evading Federal sanctions.”124  In describing the bank’s illegal 
conduct, the DFS explained that “the U.S. Government administers and 
enforces a sanctions regime against those who attempt to use the U.S. 
financial system in contravention of U.S. foreign policy and those 
foreign countries, entities, and individuals who may present a threat to 
national security.”125  Finally, under the section entitled “Apparent 
Violations of Law,” the DFS accused Standard Chartered of engaging 
“in transactions within the United States without complying with the 
requirements of 31 C.F.R. 560.516,”126 a federal regulation. 
Although Section 39 of the N.Y. Banking Law authorizes the 
DFS’s superintendent to impose sanctions for federal law violations, this 
authority creates a serious problem when state and federal regulators are 
intent on enforcing federal laws differently.127  The DFS settlement 
illuminated this problem specifically because federal regulators were on 
the verge of concluding that all of Standard Chartered’s transactions 
complied with federal law.128  Therefore, banks worried that the DFS’s 
interpretation of Iranian sanctions would undermine any the assurances 
from federal regulators that their actions were legal.129 
While the ability of a state regulator to enforce federal law against 
foreign banks may mitigate federal inaction, the divergence of state and 
                                                                                                                 
DFS for attempting to regulate activity without any specific relevance to the territory of 
New York). 
 123. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 2. 
 124. Id. at 3. 
 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. Id. at 25. 
 127. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118 (describing the concern among banks 
that state and federal regulators are interpreting the law in different ways); see also 
Henning, supra note 6 (noting that federal regulators were forced to decide whether to 
go forward with their own investigations far sooner than they would have liked as a 
result of Lawsky’s order). 
 128. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118. 
 129. See id. (“[F]ederal law enforcement officials have been fielding a flurry of 
worried calls from bank executives concerned that the rules have suddenly changed . . . 
.”). 
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federal regulators creates a level of uncertainty among the banking 
community that can be far more devastating to the national banking 
system.  When banks do not understand the rules, they hesitate to 
perform the transactions affected by those rules.130  When banks refuse 
to engage in certain financial transactions, they may fail to provide the 
services necessary to stimulate and maintain a healthy national 
economy.131  In order to avoid this uncertainty and the resulting 
consequences, state regulators should step aside to allow federal 
regulators to maintain responsibility for enforcing federal law against 
foreign banking organizations.132 
The principle of comity serves to ameliorate the problems arising 
from concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over foreign banks.  Following 
the traditional notion of judicial comity, courts give effect to the laws 
and judicial systems of another state or jurisdiction as a matter of 
practical deference, although they hold no actual obligation to do so.133  
The principal of comity is based on a mutual respect between 
jurisdictions.134  It is not a rule of law; rather, it is a voluntary expression 
of deference to the policy of another jurisdiction, particularly where that 
jurisdiction asserts a strong interest in the matter.135  The principle is 
“grounded in notions of accommodation and good-neighborliness,” and 
serves to promote balance and harmony among various state and federal 
tribunals.136 
The benefits of promoting comity in the regulatory sphere are 
particularly evidenced when—as was the case with Standard 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See generally Alison M. Hashmall, Note, After the Fall: A New Framework to 
Regulate “Too Big to Fail” Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 
843–44 (2010) (explaining that uncertainty can result in declined lending and 
investment activity). 
 131. See generally id. at 844 (noting that declined lending and investment activity 
can “exacerbate or even trigger panic and financial crises”). 
 132. See generally Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that federal regulators 
should have exercised their jurisdiction over the alleged violations committed by 
Standard Chartered, rather than the DFS, because they would have properly considered 
“the interests of the entire nation and means of inter-state trade”). 
 133. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). 
 134. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in 
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1116 (2013). 
 135. Boudreaux v. State of La., Dep’t of Transp., 897 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (2008); 
see also Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 921 A.2d 427, 441 (2007) (“Comity is 
practiced when a court of one jurisdiction voluntarily restrains itself from interfering in 
a matter falling within the purview of a court of another jurisdiction.”). 
 136. Thompson, 921 A.2d at 441. 
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Chartered—the thrust of the claims asserted by regulators derives from a 
federal law prohibiting certain transactions with a foreign nation.137  In 
this situation, it seems proper based on comity for the state regulator to 
defer to federal regulators, thereby supporting a coherent and accurate 
administration of the federal law.138  Adherence to the principle of 
comity could create a more harmonious atmosphere between state and 
federal authorities, and promote efficient regulation of foreign banks 
operating in the United States.139 
B. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE ABLE TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF 
FEDERAL REGULATORS? 
While state regulators may often be involved in investigations of 
foreign banks, the case of Standard Chartered was unique in that state 
regulators usually do not take the lead in cases involving multinational 
financial institutions.140  Instead of deferring to federal regulators and 
prosecutors, Lawsky and the DFS moved swiftly on their own against 
the bank.141  Although an active state regulator can be an integral part of 
an overarching investigation of foreign banks, problems develop when 
state and federal regulators fail to coordinate.142  This precise problem 
occurred in the DFS settlement.143 
Federal regulators, along with the general public, were blindsided 
by Lawsky’s aggressive actions against Standard Chartered.144  Indeed, 
the DFS accusations and resulting settlement compelled federal 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (explaining that the alleged Standard Chartered 
violations centered around circumvention of U.S. sanctions against Iran). 
 138. See generally id. (suggesting that federal regulators would have properly 
considered the interests of the entire nation in deciding how to apply a federal law to a 
foreign bank). 
 139. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 569 (2008) 
(explaining how the principle of comity can help avoid interstate friction in the context 
of horizontal federalism by restraining aggressive assertions of authority). 
 140. See Henning, supra note 6. 
 141. Babin, supra note 7 (discussing how Lawsky and the DFS moved forward 
against Standard Chartered without the involvement of federal regulators). 
 142. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118 (discussing how the strong accusations 
by the DFS created confusion among banks, which were relying on prior decisions by 
federal regulators, as to the legality of certain financial transactions). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Henning, supra note 6 (“Lawsky caught the Federal Reserve and the 
Justice Department off guard by accusing the bank of misconduct.”). 
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regulators to decide the course of their investigations sooner than they 
would have liked.145  The federal regulators, such as the Federal Reserve 
and the Department of Justice, also lost a valuable negotiating tactic as a 
result of Lawsky’s actions.146  By failing to move in concert with other 
regulators, the DFS jeopardized the federal regulators’ ability to reach a 
comprehensive settlement with Standard Chartered that could have 
settled all of the investigations.147  Accordingly, the federal regulators 
may have subsequently found it more difficult to extract substantial 
money payments from Standard Chartered since the bank had already 
agreed to pay $340 million to the DFS.148 
To prevent this type of “lone-ranger” move by a state regulator, the 
principle of comity must control.  Mutual respect that is the basis of 
comity should require state and federal regulators to maintain an open 
dialogue regarding their enforcement strategies,149 and state and federal 
regulators should be communicating openly about their plans to 
investigate or bring an enforcement action against a foreign bank.150  
This could be achieved if regulatory authorities provide notice to those 
with concurrent jurisdiction of when they plan either to hold a hearing or 
file claims against a foreign bank.151  Had this requirement been in force, 
the DFS would not have been able to covertly pursue Standard 
Chartered, and thereby catch the federal regulators off-guard. 
Alternatively, Congress could decide to amend the IBA to make 
comity mandatory among state and federal regulators of foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. (noting that federal regulators were hastily placed “in the uncomfortable 
position of deciding what to do with their investigations”). 
 146. See id. (explaining how the DFS case had the potential to jeopardize the federal 
investigations of Standard Chartered). 
 147. See id. 
 148. This point is bolstered by the fact that Standard Chartered agreed on December 
10, 2012 to pay $327 million in fines to federal authorities, which is even less than what 
the DFS, as a single state regulator, was able to extract from the bank. See Howard 
Mustoe, Standard Chartered Pays $327 Million on U.S.-Iran Transfers, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 10, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/standard-
chartered-pays-327-million-in-u-s-iran-transfers-case.html. 
 149. See generally Griffith & Lahav, supra note 134, at 1116 (explaining that cross-
jurisdictional communication among judges may alleviate problems arising from multi-
forum litigation). 
 150. Cf. id. (advocating for open dialogue among judges presiding over rival 
jurisdictions in order to strengthen inter-state relations). 
 151. See id. at 1126–31 (“Notice is a first step to promoting comity.”). 
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banks.152  Such an amendment might induce greater coordination among 
state and federal regulators by strengthening existing voluntary comity 
rules, or by threatening those regulators who make overly aggressive 
assertions of authority with judicial intervention.153  For example, 
although Section 3105 of the IBA provides for coordination of foreign 
bank examinations,154 it might also require coordination of enforcement 
actions against those banks.155  If this had been adopted, the DFS may 
not have been able to act independently of federal regulators in accusing 
Standard Chartered of violating state and federal law.156  Rather, the 
state and federal authorities could have worked together to reach a 
potentially sweeping settlement with the bank that could have settled 
matters definitively for all parties involved. 
C. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVING ITSELF IN ISSUES OF 
FOREIGN POLICY? 
By accusing Standard Chartered of violating United States 
sanctions against Iran, the DFS involved itself in issues of American 
foreign policy.  The relevant sanctions, administered by the United 
States Government through the OFAC, aims to prevent “those who 
attempt to use the United States financial system in contravention of 
United States foreign policy and those foreign countries, entities, and 
individuals who may present a threat to national security.”157  In the case 
of Iran, the United States Treasury Department revoked authorization 
for the “U-Turn” transactions that Standard Chartered allegedly 
processed because it suspected Iran of leveraging the transactions to 
finance the Iranian nuclear weapons program.158  Lawsky clearly 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Cf. Erbsen, supra note 139, at 569 (“Mandatory comity rules might also lead 
states to avoid conflict by strengthening their existing voluntary comity rules . . . .”). 
 153. See id. (discussing how a constitutional common law of comity might help 
avoid inter-state friction). 
 154. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 155. This type of stronger coordination is both practical and reflects the legal 
principle of comity. America’s Financial System: Law and Disorder, THE ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 13, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21564565. 
 156. Although state and federal regulators have entered into various coordination 
agreements with regard to state examination activities, see supra notes 35–38 and 
accompanying text, these agreements do not include any provisions regarding 
coordinated enforcement among state and federal regulators. 
 157. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 6. 
 158. Id. at 8. 
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understood the foreign policy implications of his allegations against 
Standard Chartered.159  He specifically accused the bank of designing 
and implementing “an elaborate scheme by which to use its New York 
branch as a front for prohibited dealings with Iran—dealings that 
indisputably helped sustain a global threat to peace and stability.”160  In 
fact, Lawsky stated that “[t]his is a case about Iran, money laundering 
and national security.”161 
The ability of the DFS, as a state regulator, to have such an impact 
on foreign policy presents both a practical and constitutional problem.  
Practically speaking, a New York regulator is charged with protecting 
the interests of New York State, not the United States as a whole.162  
Federal regulators must, however, consider the interests of the entire 
nation and means of inter-state trade before deciding whether to pursue 
a foreign bank allegedly violating United States sanctions against a 
foreign nation.163  Federal regulators, thus, may have weighed the 
negative impact on international relations and foreign trade in deciding 
not to pursue claims against Standard Chartered initially.164  By bringing 
such bold accusations and securing such a grand and public settlement 
against Standard Chartered, however, the DFS was able to assert just as 
large of an influence on foreign relations without considering the 
interests of the entire nation.165  Had the DFS worked more closely with 
federal regulators, Lawsky may have been more hesitant to move 
against Standard Chartered, and the state and federal regulators, working 
in concert, may have been able to reach a more prudent decision, taking 
into account the interests of the United States as a whole. 
Constitutionally, a state regulator’s ability to make decisions 
affecting foreign policy may undermine federal supremacy.  The United 
States Constitution vests the federal government with the power to 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See generally id. at 22 (accusing Standard Chartered of engaging in prohibited 
dealings with Iran “that helped sustain a global threat to peace and stability”); Weil, 
supra note 6 (noting that British officials were especially upset by Lawsky’s treatment 
of Standard Chartered). 
 160. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 22. 
 161. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118, at 3. 
 162. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that a New York agency should be 
confined to regulating banking activity that has a specific relevance to the territory of 
New York). 
 163. See id. (explaining that federal regulators would look at the interests of the 
entire nation and means of inter-state trade before making a determination regarding 
potential violations committed by a foreign bank). 
 164. See id.  
 165. See id. 
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regulate commerce with foreign nations.166  When Congress passes a law 
regulating commerce with foreign nations, the executive branch must 
faithfully execute it.167  Therefore, it is the United States Government, 
through the OFAC, that has the ability to administer and enforce a 
sanctions regime against Iran.168  By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,169 
a New York State regulator should not be able to make foreign policy 
decisions that run counter to those made by the United States 
Government.170  By enforcing United States sanctions against a foreign 
bank, the DFS made a decision influencing foreign policy that federal 
regulators, as representatives of the United States Government, should 
have made instead.171 
A state regulator’s ability to enforce a federal law related to foreign 
relations implicates the principle of comity, but here, international 
comity among nations as well.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law (“the Restatement”) defines the parameters of comity 
among nations with respect to the states, and focuses specifically on a 
state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state.172  According 
to the Restatement, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect 
to conduct that takes place within its territory.173  However, Section 403 
prohibits a state from prescribing law with respect to a foreign entity, 
whether or not the conduct took place within its territory, when the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.174 
Whether an exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is 
unreasonable depends on a number of relevant factors. 175   Application 
                                                                                                                 
 166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  In this case, the executive branch’s power to execute 
the laws passed by Congress is performed by the federal regulators, as part of the 
administrative state. 
 168. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.516 (2012). 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 note 5 (2012) 
(“Under United States laws, any exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe by a State is 
subject to applicable Constitutional limitations, notably Article I, Section 10, and to the 
supremacy of United States treaties and laws.”). 
 171. See Sundaresan, supra note 6. 
 172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1). 
 173. Id. § 402(1)(a). 
 174. See id. § 403(1). 
 175. Id. § 403(2)(a)–(h).  These factors include the following: 
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of these factors suggests that it is unreasonable for a New York State 
authority to be involved in the regulation of a foreign bank’s 
transactions with Iran.176  First, the character of the activity to be 
regulated, as discussed, involves issues of foreign policy, which 
traditionally are reserved for the federal government.177  Second, the 
justified expectations of foreign banks have been hurt by the DFS 
involvement because the banks reasonably expected, on the basis of the 
federal regulators’ consensus, that the transactions they engaged in were 
legal.178  Third, state regulation of a foreign bank’s transactions with 
Iran appear unimportant to the international political, legal, or economic 
system in light of the fact that the federal government is already attuned 
to the issue.179  Fourth, state regulation here is inconsistent with the 
traditions of the international system because “[i]nternational law and 
international agreements of the United States are law of the United 
States and supreme over the law of the several States.”180  Fifth, federal 
regulators have a substantially greater interest in regulating the activity 
because the dollar-clearing transactions with Iran are proscribed by 
                                                                                                                 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which 
the activity takes places within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the 
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or 
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree 
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international 
system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
Id. 
 176. There is a link between the activity of Standard Chartered and the territory of 
the regulating state, since the dollar-clearing transactions did take place in New York; 
however, application of the remaining factors demonstrates the unreasonableness of a 
state regulator’s ability to regulate a foreign bank in this case. 
 177. See Sundaresan, supra note 6. 
 178. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118. 
 179. See generally Sundaresan, supra note 6. 
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1). 
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federal not state law.181  And finally, the DFS’s involvement with 
Standard Chartered has resulted in a conflict with regulation by the 
federal authorities, creating confusion among foreign banks operating in 
the United States with regard to the legality of certain “U-Turn” 
transactions.182  Accordingly, the DFS should not have exercised 
jurisdiction over Standard Chartered’s alleged failure to comply with 
federal law regarding illicit transactions with Iran. 
D. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVED IN THE REGULATION OF A 
FOREIGN BANK OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES AT ALL? 
Admittedly, there are some benefits to allowing a state regulatory 
authority to examine and enforce violations of law against a foreign 
bank operating in its state.  For one, it would seem odd to permit state 
authorities such as the DFS to regulate state and national banks183 
operating within its territory, but not allow those authorities to regulate 
the foreign banks operating there.184  After all, the state government is 
charged with protecting the interests of its citizens, so it should be able 
to regulate the activity of any bank that is operating on its turf.185  
Furthermore, if a foreign bank is violating only state law, federal 
regulators will not be inclined to intervene to enforce the law and 
impose penalties.186  In addition, even if a foreign bank is violating a 
federal law, a state regulator’s action may prompt federal regulators to 
confront the matter, effectively providing an incentive for federal 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.516 (2012). 
 182. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118. 
 183. The National Bank Act, as codified at 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006), “generally 
places national banks under federal regulatory control, with a limited exception for 
states to enforce their own unclaimed property or escheat laws.”  Louis P. Malick, Note 
& Comment, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.: States Enforcing State 
Laws Against National Banks, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 487, 495 (2011) (explaining that the 
Act shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation). 
 184. See generally GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that the federal 
statutes providing for the regulation of foreign banks allow state banking authorities to 
retain a significant role in supervising foreign banks operating within their territory). 
 185. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that perhaps there would be no issue 
with the actions of the DFS if the alleged violations committed by Standard Chartered 
had some specific relevance to the territory of New York). 
 186. Cf. Weil, supra note 6 (suggesting that federal regulators often act 
complacently even in the face of violations of federal law). 
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regulators to more aggressively enforce violations of law and do a better 
job of overseeing large banks.187 
However, these benefits must be weighed against the negative 
consequences, described above, that were implicated by the DFS 
settlement with Standard Chartered.  By allowing the states to regulate 
foreign banks only to the extent that they are violating state law, the 
benefits of state regulation largely will remain intact.188  And indeed, the 
principle of comity also suggests that federal authorities should defer to 
the jurisdiction of state authorities over an issue derived almost entirely 
from state law.189  In such a situation, the state government would be 
able to protect the interests of its citizens by holding foreign banks 
accountable for violations of state law.190  In addition, a state regulator’s 
action against a foreign bank for violations of state law may serve to 
induce action on the part of federal regulators if the bank is also 
violating federal law.191  Simultaneously, by encouraging states to defer 
to federal regulators when enforcing violations of federal law, the 
negative consequences of state regulation of foreign banks will be 
reduced.192  Had this requirement been in place, the federal authorities 
would have taken control of the Standard Chartered case, and the DFS 
would have been unable to create the atmosphere of confusion among 
global banks and tension with foreign nations that resulted from its own 
settlement with Standard Chartered. 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See id. 
 188. Although the DFS did base several of its accusations on violations of state law, 
such as the failure to maintain accurate books and records and the falsification of books 
and reports, these violations were an afterthought to the more general allegation that 
Standard Chartered violated federal sanctions against Iran.  In other words, all of the 
state-law claims asserted were based upon Lawsky’s paramount claim that the bank 
violated federal law.  In cases such as this, where the underlying cause of action derives 
from the bank’s violation of federal law, the state regulator should defer to federal 
authorities. 
 189. See New York ex rel. Cuomo v. Dell, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 
2007) (explaining that the principles of comity and federalism prevent the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction where the case involves almost entirely an issue of state law). 
 190. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 192. It has been proposed, instead, that federal regulators should supervise national 
issues, such as international money-laundering, terrorist financing, and tax matters, 
while state regulators should be responsible for consumer protection. See The 
Prosecutorial Maze, supra note 98, at 2.  While it is true that this proposal may have 
alleviated some of the problems raised by the DFS settlement, it does not serve to 
minimize regulatory overlap in cases where the state regulator is enforcing a federal law 
that deals with domestic or seemingly local issues. See supra Part II.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
The legal principle of comity suggests that for various practical 
reasons, a state regulator should defer to the jurisdiction of federal 
authorities when a foreign bank is accused of violating federal law.  
That deference should reflect a mutual respect between state and federal 
regulators that, ultimately, would minimize issues arising from 
overlapping regulation and promote regulatory efficiency.  In the 
alternative, the IBA should be amended to require greater coordination 
between state and federal regulators examining and enforcing the law 
against foreign banks by imposing a mandatory comity requirement.  In 
effect, this would reduce the likelihood that a state regulator could act 
independently and without the interests of the entire nation in mind 
when deciding to assert claims against a foreign bank.  This approach 
attempts to balance the benefits of state regulation of foreign banks with 
the potentially calamitous consequences resulting from such regulation 
when, as in the case with Standard Chartered, a state regulator seeks to 
impose sanctions against a foreign bank for violations of federal law. 
 
